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Abstract 
 Initial public offerings, even though risky, typically underperform 
the indices for the first few years after offering. This can be explained by 
high divergence of opinion raising the initial market price, and by this 
divergence of opinion declining over time. With time, the valuation of the 
price setting marginal investor comes closer to the average investor’s 
valuation. This theory also explains why the firms with the greatest 
underperformance are those with a short operating history, low sales, low 
prestige underwriters, low institutional ownership, high volatility, high 
underpricing at the time of issuance, listing on regional exchanges, and 
those in certain industries. 
   
 In the well researched US market, it has been discovered that initial 
public offerings (IPO’s) underperform the market for the first few years 
after the offering, when return is measured from the start of trading until 
three to five years later. Such long run underperformance has also been 
reported for other markets. 
 This effect should be distinguished from the better known tendency 
for initial public offerings to be underpriced, and to hence undergo a 
sharp initial rise from the initial offering price to the start of trading (and 
hence to the first days close), an effect discussed in the same studies that 
document the long run underperformance (see references).  
 The argument will proceed in several stages. First the evidence for 
low returns from US initial public offerings will be summarized. Greater 
divergence of opinion will then be shown to raise prices. Higher prices 
alone lower the rate of return for any given stream of dividends. In 
addition, the divergence of opinion about the typical initial public offering 
declines over time, and this produces a decline in the stock price. It will 
then be argued that divergence of opinion declines after an initial public 
offering and that this can explain the long run underperformance. 
It will be shown that a number of otherwise puzzling facts related to 
the cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the long run price 
declines can be explained. These include the relationships between return 
and company size, age, industry, underwriter prestige, institutional 
ownership, exchange of listing, and initial volatility. 
Long Run Returns to IPO's  
 Ibbotson (1975), after examining one random selected security from 
each month in the sixties, found a saucer shaped pattern. There were 
positive returns near the offering, followed by below market returns, with 
the fourth year returns tending towards normal. Performance for the first 
48 months was below normal. The distribution of returns was highly 
skewed (most returns negative, but a few very high), indicating that these 
investments were individually very risky. Given the small sample size and 
the high standard deviations, the shortfall in performance was not 
statistically significant. 
Ritter (1991) examined the returns from 1,526 initial public 
offerings made between 1975 and 1984. The three-year return was 
34.47%. A control sample of 1,526 firms matched for industry and size 
returned 61.86% over the same three years. 
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Loughran (1993) examined the returns from 3,556 IPO’s during 
1967-1987 and found an average six year total return of 17.29% 
compared with 76.23% for the NASDAQ index during an identical period, 
showing results appreciably worse than Ritter had found for his three 
year tests. Strong underperformance was also found in comparison with 
firms of similar size on both the New York Stock exchange and on 
NASDAQ. A regression equation for July 1973- December 1988 had a 
statistically significant negative coefficient for having had a IPO within six 
years, even though the exchange and the book to market ratio were 
controlled for. 
Later, Loughran & Ritter (1995) examined initial public offering from 
1970-1990. They found that the average rate of return was only 5% per 
year for the five years after issuance, compared to 12 percent for firms of 
comparable size. The results are even worse for the median firms, where 
after five years, the 4,753 initial public offerings had a negative return of 
39%, while the size matched firms had a positive return of 16% for the 
five years. The authors calculate that the forgone return was $39 billion 
dollars, making the underperformance of economic significance. 
Servaes & Rajan (1997) examined initial public offerings from 1975-
1987. They found a found a five year raw return of 24%. This represented 
a 47% underperformance when compared against NYSE/AMEX index, a 
17% underperformance against the smallest decile from the 
NYSE/AMEX, and a 41% underperformance against firms matched by 
size and industry. 
Research by Bravo & Gompers (1997; Gompers & Lerner, 1999) 
using a slightly different set of years found essentially the same 
magnitude of underperformance effects, with the underperformance 
greater for non-venture capital-backed companies. Teo, Welch, and Wong 
(1998) using firms going public between 1975 and 1984 found 
underperformance, showing in addition that firms using more aggressive 
accounting had greater underperformance. Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990) 
found that 1598 IPO's offered from 1977 to 1987 underperformed the US 
market by 13.73% over the first 250 trading days. 
The underperformance has persisted even though it has been 
publicized in the business press. Forbes magazine (Stern, Richard & 
Bernstein, 1985, as cited in Ritter, 1991) found, after analyzing 1,922 
IPO’s priced over $1.00 issued from January 1975 to June 1985, that 
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"from its date as going public to last month, the average new issue was 
down 22% relative to the broad Standard & Poors 500 stock index."  
It might be noted that most of these US studies involve overlapping 
time periods, and to a large extent are reporting on the same IPO's. The 
effect is robust because differing methodologies come to the same 
conclusions despite using different statistical methods (including 
controlling for a range of other variables). However, two US studies 
covered earlier periods. Simon (1989) found that IPO's offered from 1926 
to 1933 listed on regional exchanges showed substantial 
underperformance over 60 months. Stoll & Curley (1970) found 
underperformance for 205 small issues in the fifties and sixties.  
The underperformance is not limited to the United States. Levis 
(1993) examined the three year performance of 712 UK IPO's issued 
between 1980 and 1988 and found underperformance that varied 
between 8.3% and 23.0%, depending on the benchmark chosen. Uhlir 
(1988) found an underperformance of 7.4% after one year for German 
issues 1977-1987. Finn & Higham's (1988) examined 93 Australian IPO's 
for 1966-1978. They found that buying at the end of the listing month 
and holding to the end of the first year earned 6.52% below the indices, 
but that this loss was not quite statistically significant. Kunz & Aggarwal 
(1994) found 42 Swiss IPO's between 1983 and 1989 experienced an 
underperformance of 6.1%. Keloharju (1993) found that the average 
Finnish IPO lost 22.4% from the first market trading to three years later, 
versus 1.6% average decline for the market index. The US pattern of 
underperformance appears to extend to other countries. 
The underperformance effect is not limited to developed countries, 
but also extends to emerging markets. Aggarwal, Leal, & Hernandez 
(1993) found that Brazilian IPO's had an underperformance of 47% after 
three years. For Chile, the underperformance after three years averaged 
23.7%, while for Mexico the underperformance after one year was 19.6%. 
Dawson (1987) examined the one year market adjusted returns for 
initial public offerings in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia during 
1978-1984, and found those in Hong Kong were down 9.3%, and those in 
Singapore were down 2.7%. However, neither decline was statistically 
significant. In contrast, there was a positive, statistically significant 
overperformance in Malaysia of 18.2%. The author points out that the 
Malaysian index he used was not a market wide one, but an industrial 
one. The one exception to the pattern of underperformance is India where 
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Shah (1995) finds (in a large data set with 2056 IPO's from 1991-1995), 
that the IPO's typically outperform the market for the first 200 trading 
days, and then decline. After 400 days they are approximately at the level 
of the first trading day. 
Thus, it appears that in most countries, IPO's underperform the 
market over periods of one to five years. The IPO studies mentioned 
typically do not adjust for risk (due to the difficulty of measuring risk 
when there is no trading history), but compare them to other stocks. IPO 
returns are much more variable than most stocks, with the mean return 
usually exceeding the median (a few large winners raise the average). 
Thus, because of their high risk (especially for undiversified individual 
investors who can not count on a portfolio with only a few securities 
including any of the big winners among the IPO's) one would expect them 
to outperform the indices. Even on a systematic risk basis (beta), IPO’s 
appear to be riskier than average (see below). The major problem, which 
this article aims to provide a solution for, is to explain this long run 
underperformance. 
The problem is to explain why this happens. A theory will now be 
proposed. 
Divergence of Opinion and Price 
The theory being offered to explain long run underperformance of 
initial public offerings is that the divergence of opinion about the value of 
the initial public offering typically declines over time. This causes the 
price of the stock to decline relative to its fair price (taken here to be the 
true present value of its future dividends). This effect is augmented by the 
IPO's typically having a large divergence of opinion, which in itself tends 
to raise the price and to lower the rate of return. To make this argument 
it is necessary to first show that divergence of opinion tends to raise 
prices. 
The key empirical fact is that investors differ about the valuation of 
securities. This is not surprising given the difficulty of estimating the 
value of a security. While there is general agreement among theoreticians 
that the value should equal the present value of all future cash flows (see 
standard texts such as Elton & Gruber, 1995; Haugen, 1997; or Reilly & 
Brown 1994), disagreement occurs about relevant discount rates, and the 
estimates of dividends for each particular year. Thus, the usual efficient 
markets theory assumption of homogeneous expectations is unrealistic. It 
will be replaced here with heterogeneous expectations. 
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However, to make it clear that the argument does not depend on 
systematic errors, each investor's estimates will be assumed to be 
unbiased. If we averaged the estimates of value made by each investor, 
they would correctly estimate the present value of future dividends, 
although the investor may be wrong about any particular stock. 
The bell shaped curve in the top panel of Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of investors’ opinions about the stock's value. The value 
estimates are along the horizontal axis. The estimates reflect the 
maximum amount an investor will pay for the stock. The vertical axis 
shows the number of investors who hold a certain estimate of the stock’s 
value. 
  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
  
Imagine for a moment that all investors who like a stock (i.e. believe 
it belongs in their portfolio at the current price) purchase one shares. 
Now start on the right hand part of the curve, and calculate the area 
under the curve to the right of the vertical line from the market-clearing 
rate. This area indicates the number of investors who believe the stock is 
worth purchasing at the current price. When multiplied by the typical 
number of shares an investor purchases (assumed to be one for the 
moment), the total number of shares bought is determined. 
A demand curve can be derived from this data. The stock's price is 
where this demand curve intersects the supply curve (a vertical line 
indicating the number of shares issued). This is the economist's 
traditional model of price determination applied to stocks. 
However, it is not necessary to actually draw the demand curve. 
Imagine an auction where the rate of return is dropped until there are 
just enough investors willing to hold the stock to fully absorb the existing 
shares. If each investor purchases one share, this is the number of 
shareholders the company will have. In practice, investors purchase more 
than one share, with the number depending on the size of the investor's 
portfolio and how diversified he wishes it to be. However, one can easily 
weight the investors by their wealth, or the number of shares they will 
purchase if they choose to include it in their portfolio. At the equilibrium 
rate price, the area marked represents the weighted number of investors 
required to hold the issued shares.  
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In examining the diagram, notice that the valuation of the marginal 
investor does not equal the valuation of the average investor (except by 
coincidence). For a symmetrical bell shaped curve, the average opinion is 
the valuation at the peak of the curve (the mode). Normally there are 
enough different stocks in a market that any one stock is purchased by 
only a minority of all investors. Thus, it follows that the marginal 
investor's estimate of value will be on the right hand side of the bell 
curve, as is shown in the diagram. 
Given our assumption that the investor's opinions are unbiased 
estimates of the stock's value, it implies that the price setting marginal 
investor will have a willingness to pay that exceeds the typical market 
participant’s valuation. If the typical market participant is presumed to 
have a correct estimate for the present value of all future dividends, it 
follows the price will exceed the present value of future dividends. 
Marginal investors set the price of stocks, and these are the more 
optimistic investors. In simple terms, the optimists set the price. Who the 
optimistic investors are depends on the stock. An investor who is 
optimistic about one stock may be pessimistic about another stock. In the 
model being discussed here, where every investor has unbiased return 
estimates,1 it is still possible for any particular investor to be wrong about 
a certain stock. The stocks in his portfolio will not be a random selection 
of all stocks, but will be those he is relatively optimistic about. The 
unbiasedness just means that over all stocks, the estimates are correct 
on average. 
At times, the opinions of the optimists can differ sharply from the 
average opinion. A recent example of this is provided by the Internet 
stocks, which most current investors feel are grossly overvalued. Yet 
these stocks find buyers, and their prices remain high. This theory 
explains this overpricing by noting that the optimists about these stocks 
set the prices, and they are much more optimistic about these stocks 
than the average investor. 
The basic idea here is merely an application of the idea of the 
winner's curse to the stock market (see Thaler 1992 for a discussion of 
the winner's curse). 
Now let us do the thought experiment of imagining that the shape of 
the bell curve in the top panel of Figure 1 remains constant as the 
standard deviation of the curve declines. The lower panel of Figure 1 
shows a stock with the same mean estimate of value as the stock in the 
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upper panel, but with a narrower distribution. The market-clearing price 
is marked on both diagrams. As can be seen, the price in the bottom 
panel is lower. 
This diagram demonstrates a very important point. Holding all 
things equal, the lower a stock's divergence of opinion, the lower the 
price. The price is influenced not merely by factors that affect the average 
estimate of its future value and risk, but by the extent of the divergence 
of opinion. This is a factor that is not in the traditional capital asset 
pricing model. 
It should also be noted that even when the divergence of opinion 
does not change over time, the greater the divergence of opinion the lower 
the anticipated return on the stock. This can be easily seen. The return 
over a period of time (here taken as one year for convenience) is by 
definition (Dividend + Capital Gain)/Purchase Price. The above argument 
shows that (all things equal) the greater the divergence of opinion, the 
higher the price of the security. However, from the definition of the rate of 
return, the higher the price of the security, the lower the rate of return. 
Explaining Long Run Underperformance 
Figure 1 shows that with a smaller divergence of opinion, the price 
is lower. It follows that if the divergence of opinion should decline (all 
other things equal), the stock price should also decline.  
Divergence of opinion often declines in the years following an initial 
public offering. When a company is new, there is often great uncertainty 
about its future. Some investors will be much more optimistic than 
others. These optimistic investors will set the price. As a result, the 
divergence of opinion will be greater for an initial public offering than for 
the typical seasoned stock. The effect of this greater divergence of opinion 
is to raise the stock price and lower the return. 
In addition, as the company develops an operating history, it 
becomes easier to forecast its future earnings and dividends. The 
divergence of opinion shrinks. This lowers the price relative to well-
seasoned stocks given the same mean valuations by investors (as 
depicted in the diagram). 
The above argument shows that speculators can expect to be 
disappointed. Even if their estimates of value are unbiased, they will 
suffer from a winner's curse effect in which the securities whose values 
they overestimate are disproportionately represented in their portfolio. 
The more speculative the security, as measured by the divergence of 
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opinion, the worse the performance is likely to be. Since risk and 
uncertainty are correlated with divergence of opinion (Miller 1977), 
divergence of opinion might be measured by the uncertainty about the 
returns from a security. To test this prediction it would be nice to have a 
measure of uncertainty. Such a measure is not readily available, but 
several surrogates will be discussed below. 
Short selling 
In countries where short selling is permitted, an additional effect 
may occur. The stock of initial public offerings cannot be sold short 
(except by the underwriters) at the start of trading. The reason is that the 
short selling process requires borrowing the certificates in order to make 
delivery. However, it takes a while for the underwriter to actually 
distribute the shares, and until this process is completed the stock is not 
available for lending. Of course, in many countries short selling will 
appear after the start of trading, and this short selling will lower the price 
a little. However, since the quantity of short selling in all countries is 
small, this effect is limited, even in countries where there are institutions 
for short selling. In many emerging markets short selling is not possible. 
Going through the descriptions of third world markets in Price 
(1994), among the markets for which security borrowing is not available 
are Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Turkey, Korea, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, and 
China. In other countries it is indicated as available, but rare. For 
instance, the phrase describing securities lending for Argentina is 
"permitted, but not frequently used," and for Venezuela "While securities 
lending is not specifically prohibited by law, it is rarely practiced". Selling 
short requires, among other things, the ability to borrow securities to 
deliver after the short sale. Later, securities are bought in the open 
market to replace the borrowed securities, and the short position is 
closed out. Institutions for borrowing are available in the US and other 
developed markets (although not all stocks can be borrowed, and the 
borrower frequently sacrifices part or all of the return on the proceeds of 
the short sale). 
Seasoning 
However, there is another factor. In financial theory, the value of the 
stock is the present value of the future dividends. Admittedly, the 
greatest divergence of opinion about an initial public offering will be 
about its future operating success, and hence its dividends. However, the 
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present value also depends on the rate of discount. The rate of discount 
in turn depends on the beta of the stock, and on how easily and at what 
cost it can be traded (its liquidity, for short). For seasoned companies 
with a trading history, the beta and the liquidity can be estimated fairly 
well from historical statistics, and investors do not disagree much. 
However, an initial public offering, by definition, lacks a trading history. 
Investors may differ in their estimates of the beta, and how easily and at 
what cost the stock could be traded in the future. Those that think it will 
have an illiquid market will be willing to pay much less than those who 
anticipate a very liquid market. Occasionally, there is even uncertainty 
about whether it will be accepted for exchange listing. After the public 
offering, a trading history develops and the divergence of opinion 
diminishes about the cost of trading the security, its liquidity, and its 
beta. Divergence of opinion theory predicts, all things equal, that this 
seasoning should lower the price. In contrast, the capital asset pricing 
model predicts that seasoning should raise the price by reducing the 
uncertainty. 
Testing the Theory 
As was pointed out in the introduction, what is predicted here is 
just what is observed. IPO’s underperform the market for the first few 
years. 
The above model makes other predictions, predictions that deal with 
which initial public offerings would decline most over time. The theory 
can be tested not only by observing whether initial public offerings show 
long run underperformance. It can also be tested by whether it can 
explain the cross sectional (across IPO’s) pattern of underperformance. 
The theory predicts that the greater the initial divergence of opinion 
and uncertainty, and the greater the diminution over time, the more the 
security should underperform the market. Because most initial public 
offerings represent relatively new businesses, and are frequently in new 
industries, the divergence of opinion typically diminishes over time. 
However, initial public offerings differ as to how uncertain their futures 
are. 
The model predicts that the underperformance should be greatest 
for the initial public offerings having greatest initial uncertainty about 
their true value. Since there are no direct measures of uncertainty about 
the value at the time of the initial offering, it is necessary to find variables 
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that proxy for the degree of initial uncertainty. An obvious proxy for the 
degree of risk at the time of issuance is the risk right after the IPO. 
Evidence that seasoning occurs and risk declines over time 
Shah (1995) calculates the standard deviation of returns as a 
function of the days from the start of trading for a large sample of Indian 
IPO's and shows that the returns are much more variable for the first few 
days of trading, which he interprets as a period during which the market 
is seeking the proper price for a security. 
Direct evidence that the risks of IPO's decline over time is provided 
by Finn & Higham's (1988) study of 93 Australian IPO's. They found the 
beta was a very high 3.35 for stocks in their first month, but only 1.45 
for all stocks within two months of their issue. It is clear that the 
economic risk of the business does not decline this much over the first 
month. This reduction in beta reflects a process of seasoning that is 
probably due to a reduction in the divergence of opinion about the stock. 
After the first few months, the beta varies month to month with a low of 
1.12 in the fifth month (and with beta through the twelfth and last month 
of the study being 1.32). Similar results were reported by Clarkson & 
Thompson (1990) who found that beta declined over the first 25 days and 
the first 20 months for a 1976 to 1985 sample of 198 US IPO’s. For the 
daily data, the beta declined from about 3.1 for the first day to slightly 
over one. For the monthly data it declined from 3.5 month to about 1.2 
(read from the graphs) after 10 months. 
Ritter (1991) reports that the beta averaged 1.39 for the first year, 
1.24 for the next year, and 1.14 for the third year, again showing the 
tendency for beta risk to decline over time. Betas for all three years are 
above unity. Part of these higher betas probably reflect the industry and 
size of the firms, since the betas for the matched firms were 1.14, 1.13, 
and 1.04 respectively. However, the betas for IPO’s still appear to be 
higher than for seasoned firms. 
By definition, beta is the correlation coefficient of the stock’s return 
with the market’s return multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviation 
of the stock to the market’s standard deviation. It is likely that the beta 
decline is primarily due to a decline in the variability of the stock price, 
and the process of seasoning. Seasoning in the model presented is 
accompanied by a decline in uncertainty and in divergence of opinion. It 
might be noted that the capital asset pricing model would predict that the 
decline in beta with time would be accompanied by an increase in price, 
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which would cause initial public offerings to outperform the market, 
which is the opposite to what is observed. 
If the variability in the stock price is interpreted as a measure of the 
divergence of opinion, the prediction is that the price will decline over 
time with the variance. This is what is observed. 
Volatility 
In finance, price and return volatility is frequently used as a 
measure of risk and uncertainty, surrogates for the divergence of opinion. 
Also, the greater the divergence of opinion, the greater the sensitivity to 
random buying and selling (reflecting a greater slope to the demand 
curve). Thus price and return volatility can serve as surrogates for 
divergence of opinion. Of course, volatility cannot be measured before a 
company goes public, but it can be measured afterwards. 
Ritter (1984) measured volatility by the daily standard deviation of 
the returns in the first 20 days after the initial public offerings. He 
documented that as this measure of volatility correlates with the return 
on the initial offering (The return rises from 6.4% on the least volatile 
issues up to 59.5% for the most volatile issues). 
Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998) have also found that the standard 
deviation of 2, 292 1979-1981 IPO's (over the first 225 days commencing 
6 days after the offer) has a statistically significant (one in a hundred 
level) effect on the initial underpricing of IPO's (i.e. how much they jump 
from the offering price to the price on the first day of trading. More 
relevant to the subject of this article, the same standard deviation also 
predicts the underperformance found over the first three years. This 
observation is as predicted by divergence of opinion theory.  
Initial return, uncertainty, and underperformance  
Beatty and Ritter (1986, p. 216) have argued that "the expected 
underlying underpricing of an initial public offering increased as the ex 
ante uncertainty increased." In an appendix they use Rock's (1986) 
theory2 for the equilibrium underpricing to show this mathematically. His 
1986 paper provides empirical support for this proposition. 
Ritter (1991, Table V) divides the initial public offers in his 1975-
1984 sample into five quintiles by the extent of the initial underpricing, 
and shows that the underperformance in the quintile with the greatest 
initial return (over 23.7%) had the lowest total return over three years. 
These firms return was only 9.45%, while the matched firms had 
averaged a three year return of 61.39%. For the next quintile (initial 
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returns from 23.70% to 8.105%), the IPO's had a three year performance 
of 27.94%, while the matched firms were up 65.52%. The remaining 
three quintiles did not differ greatly in the extent of their three year 
performance (from 41% to 48%), although they still showed appreciable 
underperformance. Interestingly, the effect was concentrated among the 
smaller IPO's, those with gross proceeds under $7.5 million. Size is itself 
another surrogate for difficulty of predicting the future of a company, and 
for divergence of opinion. (The offerings with lower gross proceeds are 
often of start up firms who do not yet have an established history of 
operations.) 
In a multiple regression for explaining three-year returns, Ritter 
(1991) found that initial return had the predicted negative sign, but the 
effect was not statistically significant. This is probably because the other 
variables in the equation (market return, age, volume of IPO’s in that 
year, and oil and financial institution dummies) picked up much of the 
effect of uncertainty about the offering. Let us discuss these other 
variables. 
Size and underperformance 
In discussing the initial underpricing of IPO’s, Ritter (1984, p222-
223) comments that "One proxy for the difficulty of valuing a firm is how 
established it is, where one could use the age of the firm, the book value 
of equity, its annual sales, or some combination of these to define 
established. For small firms with little or no operating history, it seems 
clear that there would be a great deal of uncertainty regarding the 
appropriate price per share, subjecting an uninformed investor to the 
adverse selection problem that ,. . . forces issues to underprice their 
offerings substantially. More established firms are presumably easier to 
value, and one would expect that, on average, less money would have to 
be left 'on the table' to compensate investors for evaluating established 
firms than for startups." He notes that the firms with low sales tended to 
be startup firms with a long history of operations. 
On this reasoning Ritter (1984) uses sales as a surrogate for risk.3 
He finds that the firms that had sales of less than $500,000 (in the most 
recent twelve month period before going public) had an initial return of 
43.4% while firms with sales over $4,000,000 had an initial return of 
9.6% (the intermediate category had returns of 18.3%). Sales is one 
measure of size, value is another. 
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Later, Loughran & Ritter (1995) reported that when all the initial 
public offerings (in their sample) from 1970 to 1990 were weighted by 
value, the value weighted buy and hold return over five years was 34% 
(versus 67% for the matching firms). They (p. 38) comment that, "This is 
higher than the equally weighted 16% average returns for the 4,753 IPO's 
going public from 1970-1990, reflecting the pattern that the smaller 
offerings (frequently more speculative firms) underperform by more than 
the large firms." This is as the theory would predict. 
Bravo & Gompers (1997) also found that the underperformance was 
greatest for the smallest (by market value) initial public offerings. For 
non-venture capital backed firms in the smallest size quintile, the five-
year return was actually negative. Likewise, Keloharju (1993) found that 
for Finland the smaller IPO's did appreciably worse than the other IPO's, 
compared to an equally weighted index. 
The smallest issues are likely to be from the newest, least 
established firms. A firm starts as an idea in someone’s head. The closer 
a firm is to the idea stage of its life history, the smaller the sales, the 
smaller the total investment, and the lower its market value. The same 
conclusion would be reached if one discounts the present value of 
operating profits. The further in time the firm is from its anticipated full 
size, the smaller the present value of its future profits. Thus, by several 
arguments it appears the small initial public offerings will be the most 
speculative ones, the ones with the greatest divergence of opinion, and 
the ones expected to underperform the most. 
Firm age  
 Ritter (1984, p223) comments on the relationship between difficulty 
in valuation and long run underperformance that "this relation is not 
sensitive to the categorization adopted, and it also holds for other risk 
proxies, such as the age of the firm." The age of the firm is probably the 
best proxy for the initial uncertainty about its future. The future of start-
ups and near start-ups is notoriously hard to predict. 
Later, Ritter (1991) tabulated returns by age to find that the three 
year wealth relatives (value compared to a portfolio of matching firms) 
increased monotonically with age. His wealth relatives measure how the 
wealth from investing in IPO’s compares to the wealth one would have 
had from investing in the comparison firms. Wealth relatives rose from a 
low of .623 for firms aged 0 –1 year (at the time of the IPO) to 1.142 for 
firms aged over 20 years. The pattern was still montonically increasing 
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when oil and gas firms (which had the worst performance of any 
industry, combined with an average age of only 2 years) and financial 
institutions (which had the best performance, combined with an average 
age of 49 years) were excluded. Thus, the effect was not due to these two 
industries. In a multi-variable equation for explaining three-year IPO 
returns, the log of 1 plus age was statistically significant (.01 level).  
Fields (1995) investigated the role of age, using even more IPO’s, 
(2793) IPO's from 1979-1989. Wealth relatives (Table 9) after three years 
were .76 for firms 0-1 years in age at the time of going public, and .72 for 
firms 2-5 years in age when they went public. These were essentially 
startups. In contrast, firms aged over 16 years, which were presumably 
well seasoned, actually outperformed her comparison firms, with a wealth 
relative of 1.07.  
The finding she emphasized was that IPO's with the larger 
institutional ownership (another measure that can be viewed as a 
surrogate for risk and divergence of opinion) outperformed those with 
smaller institutional ownership. She, as have others, found that three 
year buy and hold returns were highest for the largest IPO's (measured by 
capitalization, another surrogate for divergence of opinion). 
In a multiple regression framework with one digit industry dummy 
variables and 43 dummy variables for time, institutional ownership, age 
(in log form), and size were all statistically significant. The statistically 
significant effect for age is predicted by divergence of opinion theory, but 
not by other theories. As noted, institutional ownership and size can be 
interpreted as surrogates for the degree of uncertainty about a stock’s 
value. 
Industry 
Industry is another plausible surrogate for difficulty in forecasting. 
Certain industries (notably the high tech ones) are notoriously hard to 
forecast, while other industries are easier to predict. Bravo (1998) found 
that statistically significant underperformance was found in all but three 
industries: financial institutions, insurance, and restaurant chains. 
These are industries where people might agree more about methods of 
valuation and the future of companies, than for other industries. Ritter 
(1991) also found that financial institution’s IPO’s outperformed the 
matching firms (achieving a three-year wealth relative of 1.433). The 
difference between financial institutions’ IPO’s and other IPO’s was 
statistically significant (at the one in a thousand level). He comments (p. 
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17) “Most of the financial institution IPO’s involve mutual saving banks 
and mutual saving and loan associations converting to stock companies 
after a 1982 regulatory change.” The average age of the issuing financial 
institutions was 49 (no other industry had an average age of over 8 
years). There is probably relatively little divergence of opinion about the 
futures of such long established firms, and the little that exists is unlikely 
to diminish much after the offering. Thus the absence of 
underperformance for this industry is quite consistent with divergence of 
opinion theory. 
Underwriter reputation 
Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998) and Nanda, Yi, & Yun (1995) have 
shown that underwriter reputation is related to the long run performance 
of IPO's. It is very likely that the underwriter’s reputation reflects the 
quality of the information available, and that the IPO’s underwritten by 
lower reputation underwriters have greater divergence of opinion. The 
reason is that the underwriters with better reputations have more to lose 
from a failed underwriting, and as a result they refrain from underwriting 
IPO’s whose future is very uncertain or whose returns are hard to predict. 
Exchange of listing 
Simon (1989) found that IPO's offered from 1926 to 1933 listed on 
regional exchanges showed substantial underperformance over 60 
months, while this was not true for IPO's listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The IPO's listed on the regional exchanges had a cumulative 
60 month performance of -52% (a footnote states this was a simple sum 
of the monthly abnormal returns, and that these compounded to -39%), 
with over 85% of the firms (30 out of 35) suffering significant losses. A 
simpler model where returns were only adjusted for the market return 
(no adjustment for beta, industry etc.) showed a cumulative negative 
performance for the regionally listed firms of 74%, but a negative 
performance of 22% for the NYSE listed firms (statistically significant at 
10%). The most likely reason for the performance varying with the 
exchange is that the New York Stock Exchange had listing and disclosure 
requirements, but the regional exchanges did not. These listing 
requirements would have forced the most speculative IPO's onto the 
regional exchanges. In particular, the New York Stock Exchange’s 
requirements for historical data would have eliminated start up firms 
with only a short operating history. Also, the information disclosed 
probably served to reduce the divergence of opinion for the New York 
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Stock Exchange listed IPO’s. After the imposition of the Security and 
Exchange Commission regulations, the difference in performance among 
the exchanges disappeared. 
Implications 
The empirical evidence shows that IPO’s typically underperform the 
markets. This paper has explained why. The obvious implication for 
investors is that they should avoid investing in initial public offerings if 
they cannot get them at the issuance price (which is typically below the 
price at which they begin trading). If they do get them at the issuance 
price, it would probably be wise to “flip” them at the first practical 
opportunity (i.e. once there is no longer a threat of the underwriter 
penalizing them). In quantitative models (Jacobs & Levy 1988, for 
instance) for predicting returns from stocks, one variable should be 
whether the issue has had an initial public offering in the last few years. 
At a more sophisticated level, investors need to recognize they are 
vulnerable to a winner’s curse effect. For the investor in well seasoned 
stocks the bias is likely to be of similar effects at both the buying and 
selling ends, leaving little effect on the capital gain. However, as 
discussed above, investors in initial public offerings should expect that 
the divergence of opinion should decline over time, adversely affecting 
their returns. Thus, in making estimates of the returns to be expected 
from IPO’s, some adjustment for this effect would be appropriate. 
The problem is exactly how to adjust for the effect. As the above 
discussion showed, it is not enough to make unbiased estimates of the 
returns from investments. Even with these investors will typically be 
disappointed. The reason is that investments are not made randomly, but 
are conditional on the investor believing the stock offers high risk 
adjusted returns. This means that stocks whose returns have been 
overestimated are more likely to be included in the portfolio than stocks 
whose returns have been underestimated. As a result the returns on 
stocks conditional to being included in the portfolio tend to be less than 
expected. This effect is especially important for IPO’s where the 
divergence of opinion is especially high. 
How is the potential investor to protect himself against this effect. 
The problem has been discussed in the context of capital budgeting 
(Miller1978, forthcoming). Investing is after all merely another example of 
capital budgeting. A solution can be based on Bayesian methods. The 
estimates made with the traditional methods of security analysis are 
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combined with the prior information that arises from the knowledge that 
one is exposed to the winner’s curve effect. Bayesian statistics provides 
an optimal way to combine information from the two sources. The 
combined information can then be used for making decisions about 
investing in IPO’s. 
 
Conclusions 
 The above shows that divergence of opinion is capable of explaining 
the underpricing of initial public offerings. Divergence of opinion theory 
had earlier been applied to explaining the long run underperformance of 
IPO’s (Miller 1977), an explanation that had been noted by several 
commentators including Ritter (1991). It is now (and apparently for the 
first time) used to explain why firms with the greatest underperformance 
are those with a short operating history, low sales, low prestige 
underwriters, low institutional ownership, high volatility, high 
underpricing at the time of issuance, listing on regional exchanges, and 
in certain industries. This adds to the list of effects the theory can 
explain, since it had earlier been shown to be able to explain the 
discounts on closed end funds, the wealth creating effects of spin-offs 
(Miller 1995), and the flatness of the security market line (Miller 1999). 
A decline in divergence of opinion can be expected to lower prices, 
all things equal. Normally the divergence of opinion declines during the 
years following an initial public offering. This causes the valuation of the 
price setting marginal investor to move closer to the valuation of the 
average investor. This is why initial public offering often underperform 
the overall markets 
The extent of the long run underperformance is predicted by various 
variables that serve as surrogates for the extent of divergence of opinion. 
It is strongest for the firms with short operating histories, with low sales, 
low capitalization, underwritten by low prestige underwriters, avoided by 
institutional investors, very volatile at the start of trading, and very 
underpriced at the time of issuance. Divergence of opinion theory predicts 
all of these effects, while no other theory does so. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 In this model, the potential (but not the actual) investor's estimates of 
the rates of return are presumed to be unbiased estimates of the returns 
actually to be earned. This is to say that if every investor's estimate of all 
returns are averaged, and the experiment is repeated many times, the 
average will approach the correct value. This is probably the most 
favorable assumption that could be made for the efficient market 
hypothesis. Notice, it is being presumed that errors are being made, but 
that for every positive error there is a equally common negative error. 
 
2 Since this is not a paper about the underpricing of IPO’s, Rock's theory 
will not be discussed in detail. However, for those curious it also involves 
a winner’s curse effect in which the less informed investor’s get relatively 
less of the more oversubscribed IPO’s. To keep them willing to purchase 
IPO’s the investment banks must underprice, on average, IPO’s. Notice 
that a winner’s curse is involved in both the subject of this paper, and in 
Rock’s theory, providing one reason why the initial underpricing and the 
long run underperformance should be correlated.  
 
3 For all firms sales would not be a good surrogate for risk. However, 
sales are a good surrogate for risk in initial public offerings because firms 
with expected sales as small as $500,000 would normally attract too little 
trading to support a public market. Thus, the only firms with recent sales 
this small that are taken public are those in a start up stage that are 
expected to eventually have much greater sales. It is notoriously hard to 
forecast the future sales, profits, dividends, and stock prices for such 
start-ups. 
